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Abstract—Systems that employ network coding for content
distribution convey to the receivers linear combinations of the
source packets. If we assume randomized network coding, during
this process the network nodes collect random subspaces of
the space spanned by the source packets. We establish several
fundamental properties of the random subspaces induced in
such a system, and show that these subspaces implicitly carry
topological information about the network and its state that can
be passively collected and inferred. We leverage this information
towards a number of applications that are interesting in their
own right, such as topology inference, bottleneck discovery in
peer-to-peer systems and locating Byzantine attackers. We thus
argue that, randomized network coding, apart from its better
known properties for improving information delivery rate, can
additionally facilitate network management and control.
Index Terms—Network coding, randomized network coding,
subspace coding, random subspaces, Byzantine attack, topology
inference, topology management.
I. INTRODUCTION
Randomized network coding offers a promising technique
for content distribution systems. In randomized network cod-
ing, each node in the network combines its incoming packets
randomly and sends them to its neighbors [1], [2]. This is
the approach adopted by most practical applications today.
For example, Avalanche, the first implementation of a peer-
to-peer (P2P) system that uses network coding, adopts such a
randomized operation [3], [4]. In ad-hoc wireless and sensor
networks as well, most proposed protocols employing network
coding again opt for randomized network operation (see [9]
and references therein).
The reason for the popularity of randomized network coding
is because it facilitates a very simple and flexible network
operation without need of synchronization among network
nodes, that is well suited to packet networks. To every packet,
a coding vector is appended that determines how the packet is
expressed with respect to the original data packets produced at
the source node. When intermediate nodes combine packets,
the coding vector keeps track of the linear combinations
contained in a particular packet. A receiver which collects
enough packets, uses the coding vectors to determine the set
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of linear equations it needs to solve in order to recover the
original data packets.
Our contributions start with the observation that coding vec-
tors implicitly carry information about the network structure
as well as its state1. Such vectors belong to appropriately
defined vector spaces, and we are interested in fundamental
properties of these (finite-field) vector spaces. In particular,
since we are investigating properties induced by randomized
network coding, we need to characterize random subspaces of
the aforementioned vector spaces. These properties of random
subspaces over finite fields might be of independent interest.
We aim to show, using these properties, that observing the
coding vectors we can passively collect structural and state
information about a network. We can leverage this information
towards several applications that are interesting in their own
merit, such as topology inference, network tomography, and
network management (we do not claim here the design of
practical protocols that use these properties). However, we
show that randomized network coding, apart from its better
known properties for facilitating information delivery, can
provide us with information about the network itself.
To support this claim, we start by studying the problem
of passive topology inference in a content distribution sys-
tem where intermediate nodes perform randomized network
coding. We show that the subspaces nodes collect during the
dissemination process have a dependence with each other
which is inherited from the network structure. Using this
dependence, we describe the conditions that let us perfectly
reconstruct the topology of a network, if subspaces of all nodes
at some time instant are available.
We then investigate a reverse or dual problem of topology
inference, which is, finding the location of Byzantine attackers.
In a network coded system, the adversarial nodes in the
network can disrupt the normal operation of information flow
by inserting erroneous packets into the network. We use the
dependence between subspaces gathered by network nodes and
the topology of the network to extract information about the
location of attackers. We propose several methods, compare
them and investigate the conditions that allow us to find the
location of attackers up to a small uncertainty.
Finally, we observe that the received subspaces, even at one
specific node, reveal some information about the network, such
as the existence of bottlenecks or congestion. We consider
P2P (peer-to-peer) networks for content distribution that use
randomized network coding techniques. It is known that the
1By state we refer to link or node failures, congestion in some part of the
network, etc.
2performance of such P2P networks depends critically on the
good connectivity of the overlay topology. Building on our
observation, we propose algorithms for topology management
to avoid bottlenecks and clustering in network-coded P2P
systems. The proposed approach is decentralized, inherently
adapts to the network topology, and reduces substantially the
number of topology rewirings that are necessary to maintain a
well connected overlay; moreover, it is integrated in the normal
content distribution.
The paper is organized as follows. We start with the notation
and problem modeling in §II. We investigate the properties of
vector spaces in a system that employs randomized network
coding in §III and these properties give the framework to
explore applications in §IV, §V, and §VI. Finally, we conclude
the paper with a discussion in §VII. Shorter versions of these
results have also appeared in [10], [11], and [12].
A. Related Work
Network coding started by the work of Ahlswede et al. [13]
who showed that a source can multicast information at a
rate approaching the smallest min-cut between the source and
any receiver if the middle nodes in the network combine
the information packets. Li et al. [14] showed that linear
network coding with finite field size is sufficient for multicast.
Koetter et al. [15] presented an algebraic framework for linear
network coding.
Randomized network coding was proposed by Ho et al. [1],
[16] where they showed that randomly choosing the network
code leads to a valid solution for a multicast problem with
high probability if the field size is large. It was later applied by
Chou et al. [2] to demonstrate the practical aspects of random
linear network coding. Gkantsidis et al. [3], [4] implemented
a practical file sharing system based on this idea. Several
other works have also adopted randomized network coding
for content distribution, see for example [5], [6], and [7].
Network error correcting codes, that are capable of correct-
ing errors inserted in the network, have been developed during
the last few years. For example see the work of Koetter et
al. [17], Jaggi et al. [18], Ho et al. [19], Yeung et al. [20], [21],
Zhang [22], and Silva et al. [23]. These schemes are capable
of delivering information despite the presence of Byzantine
attacks in the network or nodes malfunction, as long as the
amount of undesired information is limited. These network
error correcting schemes allow to correct malicious packet
corruption up to certain rate. In contrast, we use network
coding to identify malicious nodes in our work. Recently, and
following our work [12], additional approaches are proposed
in the literature, some building on our results [24].
Overlay topology monitoring and management that do not
employ network coding has been an intensively studied re-
search topic, see for example [25]. However, in the context
of network coding, it is a new area of research. Fragouli et
al. [26], [27] took advantage of network coding capabilities for
active link loss network monitoring where the focus was on
link loss rate inference. Passive inference of link loss rates has
also been proposed by Ho et al. [28]. In a subsequent work of
ours, Sharma et al. [29] study passive topology estimation for
the upstream nodes of every network node. This work is based
on the assumption that the local coding vectors for each node
in the network are fixed, generated in advance and known by
all other nodes in the network, unlike our work that builds
on randomized operation. The idea of passive inference of
topological properties from subspaces that are build over time,
as far as we know, is a novel contribution of this work.
II. MODELS: CODING AND NETWORK OPERATION
A simple observation motivates much of the work presented
in this paper: the subspaces gathered by the network nodes
during information dissemination with randomized network
coding, are not completely random, but have some rela-
tionship, and this relationship conveys information about the
network topology as well as its state. We will thus investigate
properties of the collected subspaces and show how we can
use them for diverse applications.
Different properties of the subspaces are relevant to each
particular application and therefore we will develop a frame-
work for investigating these properties. This will also involve
some understanding of modeling the problem to fit the re-
quirements of an application and then developing subspace
properties relevant to that model.
A. Notation
Let q ≥ 2 be a power of a prime. In this paper, all vectors
and matrices have elements in a finite field Fq . We use Fn×mq
to denote the set of all n × m matrices over Fq, and F!q to
denote the set of all row vectors of length !. The set F!q forms
an !-dimensional vector space over the field Fq. Note that all
vectors are row vectors unless otherwise stated. Bold lower-
case letters, e.g., v, are used for vectors and bold capital letters,
e.g., X , are used to denote matrices.
For a set of vectors {v1, . . . ,vk} we denote their linear span
by 〈v1, . . . ,vk〉. For a matrixX , 〈X〉 is the subspace spanned
by the rows of X . We then have rank(X) = dim(〈X〉).
We denote subspaces of a vector space by Π and sometimes
also by pi. In this paper, we work on a vector space F!q of
dimension ! defined over a finite field Fq . For two subspaces
Π1,Π2 ⊆ F!q, we will denote their intersection by Π1 ∩ Π2
and their joint span by Π1 +Π2 where
Π1 +Π2 ! {v1 + v2|v1 ∈ Π1,v2 ∈ Π2},
is the smallest subspace that contains both Π1 and Π2. It is
well known that
dim(Π1 +Π2) = dim(Π1) + dim(Π2)− dim(Π1 ∩ Π2).
We also use the following metric to measure the distance
between two subspaces,
dS(Π1,Π2) ! dim(Π1 + Π2)− dim(Π1 ∩ Π2) (1)
= dim(Π1) + dim(Π2)− 2 dim(Π1 ∩Π2).
This metric was also introduced in [17], where it was used to
design error correction codes.
In addition to the metric dS(·, ·) defined above, in some
cases we will also need a measure that compares how a set A
3of subspaces differs from another set B of subspaces. For this
we will use the average pair-wise distance defined as follows
DS(A,B) !
1
|A||B|
∑
pia∈A,pib∈B
dS(pia,pib). (2)
It should be noted that the above relation does not define a
metric for the set of subspaces because the self distance of
a set with itself is not zero. However, DS(·, ·) satisfies the
triangle inequality.
In this paper we will be interested in investigating the
relationship of the collected subspaces at neighboring network
nodes. We consider a network represented as a directed acyclic
graph G = (V,E), with ϑ = |V | nodes and ξ = |E| edges.
For an arbitrary edge e = (u, v) ∈ E, we denote head(e) = v
and tail(e) = u. For an arbitrary node v ∈ V , we denote
In(v) the set of incoming edges to v and Out(v) the set of
outgoing edges from v. If a node u has p parents u1, . . . , up,
we denote with P (u) = {u1, . . . , up} the set of parents of u.
We use P l(u) to denote the set of all ancestors of u at distance
l from u in the network (we say that two nodes u and v are
at distance l if there exists a path of length exactly l that
connects them). We denote with pi(ui)u (t) the subspace node u
receives from parent ui at exactly time t, and with piu(t) the
whole subspace (from all parents) that node u receives at
time t, that is piu(t) =
∑p
i=1 pi
(ui)
u (t). We also denote with
Π(ui)u (t) the subspace node u has received from parent ui up
to time t, that is, Π(ui)u (t) = Π(ui)u (t− 1) + pi(ui)u (t). Then the
subspace Πu(t) that the node has at time t can be expressed as
Πu(t) =
∑p
i=1Π
(ui)
u (t). For a set of nodes U = {u1, . . . , up},
we define ΠU = Πu1 + · · ·+Πup .
Finally, we use the big O notation which is defined as
follows. Let f(x) and g(x) be two functions defined on some
subset of the real numbers. We write f(x) = O(g(x)) if and
only if there exists a positive real numberM and a real number
x0 such that |f(x)| ≤M |g(x)| for all x > x0. During the rest
of the paper, we use the big O notation to compare functions
of the field size q, unless otherwise stated. For example, we
will use f(q) = O(q−1) to imply that the value of f(q) goes
to zero as q−1 for q →∞.
B. Network Operation
We assume that there is an information source located on a
node S that has a set of n packets (messages) {x1, . . . ,xn},
xi ∈ F!q, to distribute to a set of receivers, where each
packet is a sequence of ! symbols over the finite field Fq.
To do so, we will employ a dissemination protocol based on
randomized network coding, namely, where each network node
sends random linear combinations (chosen to be uniform over
Fq) of its collected packets to its neighbors. We assume for
simplicity that there are no packet-losses.
Dissemination Protocol
It is possible to separate the dissemination protocols into
the following operation categories.
• Synchronous: All nodes are synchronized and transmit to
their neighbors according to a global clock tick (time-
slot). At time-slot t ∈ N, node v sends linear com-
binations from all vectors it has collected up to time
t− 1. Once nodes start transmitting information, they
keep transmitting until all receivers are able to decode.
• Asynchronous: Nodes transmit linear combinations at
randomly and independently chosen time instants.
In this paper, we focus on the synchronous network where
we assume that each link has unit delay2 corresponding to each
time-slot, however our results can be extended to asynchronous
networks as well.
Next, we explain in detail the dissemination protocol, that
is summarized in Algorithm II.1.
Timing: We depict in Fig. 1 the relative timing of events
within a time-slot. Nodes transmit at the beginning of a time-
slot. We assume that each packet is received by its intended
receiver before the end of the time-slot. Thus, the time-slot
duration incorporates the packet propagation delay in one edge
of the network.
Timet− 1 t
Slot number t
A
B
A Transmits
B Receives{
The point that subspaces
are measured: ΠB(t)
ΠA(t− 1)
Fig. 1. Timing schedule of the dissemination protocol given by Algo-
rithm II.1.
Rate Allocation and Equivalent Network Graph: The
dissemination protocol first associates with each link e of
the network a rate re (measured as the number of packets
transmitted per time-slot on edge e). These rates are selected
in advance using a rate allocation method, for example [8].
For the rest of the paper, we consider an equivalent network
graph, where each edge e has capacity equal to its allocated
rate re. On this new graph, we can define the min-cut cv from
the source node S to a node v ∈ V . Whenever we refer to
min-cut values in the following, we imply min-cut values over
this equivalent graph.
We assume that the rate allocation protocol we use satisfies
re ≤ min[ce, ctail(e)], (3)
where ce is the capacity of edge e. This very mild assumption
says that the node v = tail(e) does not send more information
than it receives, and is satisfied by all protocols that do not
send redundant packets.
In our work, we consider the case where n , cv, namely,
the dissemination of the n source packets to the receivers takes
place by using the network over several time-slots.
2Unit delay can model a buffering window a node needs to wait to collect
packets from all its neighbors.
4Node Operation: When the dissemination starts, at time-
slot say zero, the source starts transmitting at each time-slot
and to each of its outgoing edges e, re randomly selected
linear combinations of n information packets. We will call rS
the source rate. The source continues until it has transmitted
linear combinations of all n packets, i.e., for nrS times-lots.Every other node v ∈ V \ {S} in the network, operates as
follows:
• Initially it does not transmit, but only collects in a buffer
packets from its parents, until a time τv , which we call
waiting time and we will define in the following. As we
will see, each node can decide the waiting time by itself
and independently from other nodes.
• At each time-slot t, for all t ≥ τv+1, it transmits to each
outgoing edge e, re linear combinations of all packets it
has collected in its buffer up to time t− 1.
Collected Subspaces: We can think of each of the n
source messages {xi} as corresponding to one dimension of
an n-dimensional space ΠS ⊆ F!q where ΠS = 〈x1, . . . ,xn〉.
We say that node v ∈ V at time t observes a subspace Πv(t) ⊆
ΠS , with dimension dv(t) ! dim(Πv(t)), if Πv(t) is the space
spanned by the received vectors at node v up to time t. Initially,
at time t = 0, the collected subspaces of all nodes (apart the
source) are empty; dv(0) = 0, ∀v ∈ V \ {S}.
Waiting Times: We next define the waiting times, that
will be used in the following sections to ensure that the
subspaces of different nodes be distinct, and are a usual
assumption in dissemination protocols; indeed, for large n
the waiting time does not affect the rate. For example, in the
information-theoretic proof of the main theorem in network
coding [13], each node waits until it collects at least one
message from each of its incoming links before starting
transmissions.
Definition 1: The waiting time τv for a node v is the first
time-slot during which node v receives information from the
source at a rate equal to its min-cut cv , and additionally, has
collected in its buffer a subspace of dimension at least cv+1.
Note that, because we are dealing with acyclic graphs, we
can impose a partial order on the waiting times of the nodes,
such that all parents of a node have smaller waiting time
than the node. Moreover, each node can decide whether the
conditions for the waiting time are met, by observing whether
it receives information at a rate equal to its min-cut, and what
is the dimension of the subspace it has collected. That is,
a node does not need to know any topological information
(apart from its min-cut), and the waiting times do not need to
be communicated in advance to the nodes, but can be decided
online based on the network conditions.
Algorithm II.1: DISSEMINATIONPROTOCOL(G =
(V,E), S, n, τv, re)
for each v ∈ V \ {S}
do Πv(0) = ∅, dv(0) = 0
t← 1
while minv dv(t) < n

for each v ∈ V

if t ≥ τv + 1
then


for each e ∈ Out(v)
do
{node v transmits from
Πv(t− 1) with rate re on e
for each v ∈ V
do update Πv(t), dv(t)
t← t+ 1
Alg. II.1: Dissemination protocol.
Source Operation and the Source Subspace ΠS
As we discussed, the source needs to convey to the receivers
n source packets that span the n-dimensional subspace ΠS =
〈x1, . . . ,xn〉, with ΠS ⊆ F!q . ΠS is isomorphic to Fnq ; thus,
for the purpose of studying relationships between subspaces
of ΠS , we can equivalently assume that ΠS = Fnq , and that
node v ∈ V at time t observes a subspace Πv(t) ⊆ ΠS . This
simplification is very natural in the case where we employ
coding vectors, reviewed briefly in the following, as we only
need consider the coding vectors for our purposes and ignore
the remaining contents of the packets; however, we can also
use the same approach in the case where the source performs
non-coherent coding, described subsequently.
a) Use of Coding Vectors: To enable receivers to decode,
the source assigns n symbols of each message vector (packet)
to determine the linear relation between that packet and the
original vectors xi, i = 1, . . . , n. Without loss of generality, let
us assume these n symbols (which form a vector of length n)
are placed at the beginning of each message vector. This vector
is called coding vector. Each message vector xi contains two
parts. The vector xCi ∈ Fnq with length n is the coding vector
and remaining part, xIi ∈ F!−nq , is the information part where
xi ! [x
C
i | x
I
i ].
The coding vectors xCi , i = 1, . . . , n are chosen such that they
form a basis for Fnq . For simplicity we assume xCi = ei where
ei ∈ Fnq is a vector with one at position i and zero elsewhere.
For our purposes, it is sufficient to restrict our algorithms
to examine the coding vectors. Thus, the source has the space
ΠS = Fnq ; during the information dissemination, if a node v
at time t has collected m packets zi with coding vectors zCi ,
it has observed the subspace Πv(t) =
〈
zC1 , . . . , z
C
m
〉. In other
words, the coding vectors capture all the information we need
for our applications.
b) Subspace Coding: Our approach also works in the
case of subspace coding, that was introduced in [17]. We next
briefly explain the idea of communication using subspaces, in
a network performing randomized network coding.
In the following, we use the same notation as introduced
in §II-B. Let {x1, . . . ,xn}, xi ∈ F!q denote the set of
5packets the source has. Assume that there is no error in
the network. An arbitrary receiver Rv at node v collects m
packets zi, i = 1, . . . ,m, where each zi can be presented
as zi =
∑n
j=1 hijxj . The coefficients hij are unknown and
randomly chosen over Fq. In matrix form, the transmission
model can be represented as
Zv =HSvX,
where HSv ∈ Fm×nq is a random matrix and X ∈ Fn×!q is
the matrix whose rows are the sources’ packets.
The matrices HSv are randomly chosen, under constraints
imposed by the network topology. As stated in [17] and proved
in [30], [31], [32], the above model naturally leads to consider
information transmission not via the choice of xi but rather
by the choice of the vector space spanned by {xi}, i.e., ΠS =
〈x1, . . . ,xn〉.
In the case of subspace coding, the dissemination algorithm
works in exactly the same way as in the case of coding vectors;
what changes is how the source maps the information to the
packets it transmits, and how decoding occurs. However, this is
orthogonal to our purposes, since we perform no decoding of
the information messages, but simply observe the relationship
between the subspaces different nodes in the network collect.
Thus, the same approach can be applied in this case as well.
C. Input to Algorithms
We are interested in designing algorithms that leverage the
relationships between subspaces observed at different network
nodes for network management and control. The algorithms
design will depend on the information that we have access to.
We distinguish between the following.
• Global information: A central entity knows the subspaces
that all ϑ nodes in the network have observed.
• Local Information: There is no such omniscient entity,
and each node v only knows what it has received, its
own subspace Πv.
We may also have information between these two extreme
cases. Moreover, we may have a static view, where we take
a snapshot of the network at a given time instant t, or a non-
static view, where we take several snapshots of the network
and use the subspaces’ evolution to design an algorithm.
We will argue in Section IV that capturing even global
information can be accomplished with relatively low overhead
(sending one additional packet per node at the end of the
dissemination protocol); thus, the algorithms we develop even
assuming global information can in fact be implemented
almost passively and at low cost.
III. PROPERTIES OF RANDOM VECTOR SPACES OVER A
FINITE FIELD Fnq
In this section, we will state and prove basic properties
and results that we will exploit towards various applications
in the following sections. In particular, we will investigate
the properties of random sampling from vector spaces over
a finite field. Such properties give us a better insight and
understanding of randomized network coding and form a
foundation for the results and algorithms presented in this
paper.
A. Sampling Subspaces over Fnq
Here, we explore properties of randomly sampled subspaces
from a vector space Fnq . We start with the following lemma
that explores properties of a single subspace.
Lemma 1: Suppose we choose m vectors from an n-
dimensional vector space ΠS = Fnq uniformly at random to
construct a subspace Π. Then the subspace Π will be full rank
(has dimension min[m,n]) w.h.p. (with high probability)3,
namely,
P [dim(Π) = min[m,n]] = [1−O
(
q−1
)
].
Proof: Refer to Appendix A.
We conclude that for large values of q, selecting m ≤ n
vectors uniformly at random from Fnq to construct a subspace
Π is equivalent to choosing an m-dimensional subspace from
Fnq uniformly at random. Note that this is not true for small
values of q.
We next examine connections between multiple subspaces.
Lemma 2: Let Π1 and Π2 be two subspaces of ΠS = Fnq
with dimension d1 and d2 respectively, intersection of di-
mension d12 and Π1 " Π2 (i.e., d12 < d1). Construct Π′1
by choosing m vectors from Π1 uniformly at random. Then
P [Π′1 ⊂ Π2] = O (q
−m) .
Proof: Refer to Appendix A.
Lemma 3: Suppose Πk is a k-dimensional subspace of a
vector space ΠS = Fnq . Select m vectors uniformly at random
from ΠS to construct the subspace Π. Then we have
dim(Π ∩ Πk) = min[k, (m− (n− k))
+]
= (min[m,n] + k − n)+ , (4)
with probability 1−O (q−1).
Proof: Refer to Appendix A.
Corollary 1: Suppose Π1 and Π2 are two subspace of Fnq
with dimension d1 and d2 respectively and joint dimension
d12. Let us take m1 vectors uniformly at random from Π1
and m2 vectors from Π2 to construct subspaces Πˆ1 and Πˆ2.
Then we have
dim(Πˆ1 ∩ Πˆ2) =min
[
d12, (m1 +m2 − (d1 + d2 − d12))
+,
(m1 − (d1 − d12))
+, (m2 − (d2 − d12))
+
]
,
with probability 1−O (q−1).
Proof: Refer to Appendix A.
By choosing Π1 = Π2 = Fnq in Corollary 1 we have the
following corollary.
Corollary 2: Let us construct two subspaces Πˆ1 and Πˆ2 by
choosingm1 andm2 vectors uniformly at random respectively
from Fnq . Then the subspaces Πˆ1 and Πˆ2 will be disjoint with
probability 1−O (q−1) if m1 +m2 ≤ n.
We are now ready to discuss one of the important properties
of randomly chosen subspaces which is very useful for our
work: randomly selected subspaces tend to be “as far as
possible”. We will clarify and make precise what we mean
by “as far as possible”, see also [33]. We first review the
3Throughout this paper, when we talk about an event occurring with high
probability, we mean that its probability behaves like 1 − O (q−1), which
goes to 1 as q →∞.
6definition of a subspace in general position with respect to a
family of subspaces.
Definition 2 ([33, Chapter 3]): Let ΠS be an n-
dimensional vector space over the field Fq and for
i = 1, . . . , r, let Πi be a subspace of ΠS , with dim(Πi) = di.
A subspace Π ⊆ ΠS of dimension d is in general position
with respect to the family {Πi} if
dim(Πi ∩ Π) = max [di + d− n, 0] , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , r}. (5)
It should be noted that max[di + d− n, 0] is the minimum
possible dimension of (Πi ∩Π). So what the above definition
says is that the intersection of Π and each Πi is as small as
possible. Using the above definition we can state the following
theorem4.
Theorem 1: Suppose {Πi}, i = 1, . . . , r, are subspaces
of ΠS = Fnq . Let us construct a subspace Π by randomly
choosing m vectors from ΠS . Then Π will be in general
position with respect to the family {Πi} w.h.p., i.e., with
probability 1−O (q−1).
Proof: Refer to Appendix A.
Theorem 1 demonstrates a nice property of randomized net-
work coding where the subspaces spanned by coding vectors
tend to be as far as possible on different paths of the network.
B. Rate of Innovative Packets
In the following sections, we will need to know the rate
of receiving innovative message vectors (packets) at receivers
in a dissemination protocol performing randomized network
coding. By innovative we refer to vectors that do not belong
in the space spanned by already collected packets. As it is
shown in [13], the source can multicast at rate equal to the
minimum min-cut of all receivers if the intermediate nodes
can combine the incoming messages. Moreover, it is shown
in [14] that using linear combinations is sufficient to achieve
information transfer at a rate equal to the minimum min-
cut of all receivers. In [13], [1], it is also demonstrated that
choosing the coefficients of the linear combinations randomly
is sufficient (no network-specific code design is required) with
high probability if the field size is large enough.
To find the rate of receiving information at each node where
the implemented dissemination protocol performs randomized
network coding, we can use the following result given in
Theorem 2. Note that our described dissemination protocol,
although very common in practice, does not exactly fit to
the previous theoretical results in the literature that examine
rates, because the operation of the network nodes is not
memory-less. That is, while for example in [1], [13], [14] each
transmitted packet at time t is a function of a small subset of
the received packets up to time t (the ones corresponding to the
same information message), in our case a packet transmitted at
time t is a random linear combination of all packets received
up to time t. This small variant of the main theorem on
randomized network coding is very intuitive, and we formally
state it in following.
4Different versions of this theorem can be easily derived from results in
the literature [33], but we repeat here a short derivation for completeness.
Theorem 2: Consider a source that transmits n packets
over a connected network using the dissemination protocol
described in §II-B, and assume that the network nodes perform
random linear network coding over a sufficiently large finite
field. Then there exists t0 such that for all t > t0 each node
v in the network receives cv independent linear combinations
of the n source packets per time slot, where cv = min-cut(v).
Proof: Refer to Appendix B-A.
Given Theorem 2, we can state the following definition.
Definition 3: For a specific information dissemination pro-
tocol over a network, we define the steady state as the time
period during which each node v in the network receives
exactly cv independent linear combinations of the n source
packets per time slot and none of the nodes, except source
S, has collected n linearly independent combinations. We call
the time that the network enters steady state phase the steady
state starting time and denote it by Ts. If the network never
attains the steady state phase then we set Ts =∞.
For our protocol in §II-B, Ts depends not only on the
network topology, but also on the waiting times τv . For the
waiting time defined in Definition 1 we can upper bound Ts
as stated in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4: If n is large enough, for the dissemination
protocol given in §II-B we may upper bound the steady state
starting time as follows
Ts ≤ 2D(G),
whereD(G) is the longest path from the source to other nodes
in the network5.
Proof: Refer to Appendix A.
In order to be sure that the dissemination protocol given in
§II-B enters the steady state phase, n should be large enough.
Using Lemma 4 we have the following result, Corollary 3.
Corollary 3: A sufficient condition for n to be sure that the
protocol enters the steady state is that
2D(G) < 0
n
cmax
1,
where cmax = maxv∈V cv.
IV. TOPOLOGY INFERENCE
In this section, we will use the tools developed in §III to
investigate the relation between the network topology and the
subspaces collected at the nodes during information dissemi-
nation. We will develop conditions that allow us to passively
infer the network topology with (asymptotically on the value
of q) no error. The proposed scheme is passive in the sense
that it does not alter the normal data flow of the network,
and the information rates that can be achieved. In fact, we
can think of our protocol as identifying the topology of the
network which is induced by the traffic.
We build our intuition starting from information dissem-
ination in tree topologies, and then extend our results in
arbitrary topologies. Note that information dissemination using
network coding in tree topologies does not offer throughput
5Note that D(G) is different from the longest shortest path which is called
diameter of G in the graph theory literature.
7benefits as compared to routing; however, it is an interesting
case study that will naturally lead to our framework for
general topologies. We then define conditions under which
the topology of a tree and that of an arbitrary network can be
uniquely identified using the observed subspaces. Note that
uniquely identifying the topology is a strong requirement, as
the number of topologies for a given number of network nodes
is exponential in the number of nodes.
A. Tree Topologies
Let G = (V,E) be a network that is a directed tree of
depth D(G), rooted at the source node S. We will present
(i) necessary and sufficient conditions under which the tree
topology can be uniquely identified, and (ii) given that these
conditions are satisfied, algorithms that allow us to do so.
We first consider trees where each edge is allocated the
same rate c, and thus the min-cut from the source to each
node of the tree equals c. We then briefly discuss the case
of undirected trees. Finally we examine the case where edges
are allocated different rates, and thus nodes may have different
min-cuts from the source.
1) Common Min-Cut: Assume that each edge of the tree
has the same capacity c (i.e., a rate allocation algorithm has
assigned the same rate re = c on each edge of the tree).
Thus all nodes in the tree have the same min-cut, equal to
c. Then according to the dissemination protocol introduced
in Algorithm II.1, each node v will wait time τv , until it
has collected a c + 1 dimensional subspace, and then start
transmitting to its children. Our claim is that, we can then
identify the network topology using a single snapshot of all
nodes’ subspaces at a time t. Before formally proving the
result in Theorem 3, we will give some intuition on why this
is so, and why the waiting time is crucial to achieve this. We
start from an example on the simple network in Figure 2.
Example 1: Consider the tree in Figure 2 and assume that
the edges have unit capacity (c = 1). Algorithm II.1 works
as follows. At time t = 1, node A receives a vector y1 from
the source S. Node A waits, as it has not yet collected a
c+ 1 = 2 dimensional subspace. At time t = 2, it receives a
vector y2. It now has collected the subspace ΠA(2) = 〈y1, y2〉,
and thus at the next time-slot it will start transmitting. At time
t = 3, node A transmits vectors yB1 and yC1 to nodes B and
C respectively, with yB1 , yC1 ∈ ΠA(2). Thus ΠB(3) =
〈
yB1
〉
and ΠC(3) =
〈
yC1
〉. Node A also receives a vector y3 from
the source, and thus ΠA(3) = 〈y1, y2, y3〉. Consider now the
subspaces ΠA(3), ΠB(3) and ΠC(3). We see that ΠB(3) ⊆
ΠA(3), and ΠC(3) ⊆ ΠA(3); we thus conclude that nodes B
and C are children of node A. Moreover, ΠB(3) 2= ΠC(3),
which will allow us to distinguish between children of these
two nodes when we deal with larger trees.
In contrast, if Algorithm II.1 did not impose a waiting time,
and node A started transmitting to nodes B and C at time
t = 2, then both nodes B and C would receive the same
subspace 〈y1〉, i.e., ΠB(2) = ΠC(2) = 〈y1〉. In fact, at all
subsequent times, we will have that ΠB(t) = ΠC(t) = ΠA(t−
1). Thus, we would not be able to distinguish between these
two nodes. "
S ΠS
A ΠA(t)
BΠB(t) C ΠC(t)
piA(t)
piB(t) piC(t)
Fig. 2. Directed tree with four nodes rooted at the source S.
The main idea in our result is that, if we consider two nodes
u and v in the network which have collected subspaces Πu(t)
and Πv(t) at time t, then, unless u and v have a child-ancestor
relationship (i.e., are on the same branch in the tree), it holds
that Πu(t) " Πv(t) and Πv(t) " Πu(t).
The challenge in proving this is that we deal with subspaces
evolving over time, and thus we cannot directly apply the
results in §III. For example, for the network in Figure 2,
ΠB(t) and ΠC(t) are not subspaces that are selected uniformly
at random from ΠA(t); instead, they are build over time as
ΠA(t) also evolves. We will thus need the following two
results, that modify the results in §III to take into account
the time evolution in the creation of the subspaces. We start
by examining in Lemma 5 the relationship between subspaces
collected at the immediate children of a given parent node
(for example, at the children B and C of node A). These
are created by sampling the same subspaces (those at node
A). We then examine in Corollary 4 the relationship between
subspaces collected at nodes that have different parents (for
example, a node that has B as parent and a node that has C
as parent).
Lemma 5: Suppose there exist (proper) subspaces Π(0) ⊂
Π(1) ⊂ · · · ⊂ Π(t − 1) with dimensions d0, . . . , dt−1,
respectively. Let us construct the set of subspaces Πu(i),
i = 1, . . . , t, as follows. Set Πu(i) =
∑i
j=1 piu(j) where
piu(j) is the span of ku(j) vectors chosen uniformly at random
fromΠ(j−1) such that ku(1) < d0 and ku(j) ≤ (dj−1−dj−2)
for j = 2, . . . , t. Similarly, we construct the set of subspaces
Πv(i) =
∑i
j=1 piv(j) where for kv(j) we have similar
conditions, namely, kv(1) < d0 and kv(j) ≤ (dj−1 − dj−2)
for j = 2, . . . , t. Then we have
Πu(i) " Πv(j) and Πv(j) " Πu(i) ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , t},
with high probability.
Proof: Refer to Appendix A.
Corollary 4: Suppose that there exist two set of subspaces
{Πu(i)}
t−1
i=0 and {Πv(i)}t−1i=0 such that Πu(0) ⊂ · · · ⊂ Πu(t−
1) and Πv(0) ⊂ · · · ⊂ Πv(t − 1). Moreover, assume that
Πu(i) " Πv(j) and Πv(j) " Πu(i) ∀i, j ∈ {0, . . . , t −
1}. Now, construct two set of subspaces {Πa(i)}ti=1 and
{Πb(i)}ti=1 by setting Πa(i) =
∑i
j=1 pia(j) and Πb(i) =∑i
j=1 pib(j) where pia(i) is chosen uniformly at random from
Πu(i − 1) and pib(i) is chosen uniformly at random from
8Πv(i− 1) (with some arbitrary dimension). Then we have
Πa(i) " Πb(j) and Πb(j) " Πa(i) ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , t},
with high probability.
Proof: Refer to Appendix A.
Theorem 3: Consider a tree of depth D(G) where each
edge has capacity c, and the dissemination Algorithm II.1.
A static global view of the network at time t, with
2D(G) < t < 0nc 1, allows to uniquely determine the tree
structure with high probability, if the waiting times are chosen
according to Definition 1.
Proof: We will say that a node of the tree is at level l
if it has distance l from the source. In a tree there exists a
unique path Pu = {S, P lu−1(u), . . . , P (u), u} from source S
to node u at level lu of the network.
If we consider a time t in steady state (where all nodes
have nonempty subspaces and none has collected the whole
space), then clearly using Algorithm II.1 for dissemination in
the network for the nodes along the path Pu it holds that
Πu(t) ⊂ ΠP (u)(t) ⊂ · · · ⊂ ΠP lu−1(u)(t) ⊂ ΠS . (6)
Note that the conditions on t ensure that the network is in
steady-state.
To identify the topology of the tree it is sufficient to show
that Πu(t) " Πv(t) for any node v that is not in Pu. Let lu
and lv be the distance of u and v from the source, respectively.
First, we observe that, starting from the source, by applying
Lemma 5 and Corollary 4 and because of Definition 1 the
subspaces of the nodes at the same level (same distance from
the source) are different at all times. So it only remains to
check the condition Πu(t) " Πv(t) for those node v that are
not in the same level as u.
Consider two cases. First, if lu < lv then let v′ be the
ancestor of v at the same level as u. By Corollary 4 we have
Πu(t) " Πv′(t) so Πu(t) " Πv(t) because Πv(t) ⊆ Πv′(t).
Now consider the second case, lu > lv. We start by assum-
ing Πu(t) ⊆ Πv(t) and then we will show that this assumption
leads to a contradiction. Let u′ be the ancestor of u at the same
level of v. Then we make the following observation. If at time
t we have Πu(t) ⊆ Πv(t) by Lemma 2 we should have had
ΠP (u)(t−1) ⊆ Πv(t) and so ΠP 2(u)(t−2) ⊆ Πv(t) and finally
we should had had Πu′(t − lu + lv) ⊆ Πv(t). But according
to Corollary 4 this is a contradiction because u′ and v are at
the same level.
In the above argument, we have shown that ΠP (u)(t) is the
smallest subspace contains Πu(t) among all nodes’ subspaces
at time t. So we are done.
Assume now that Theorem 3 holds. To determine the tree
structure, it is sufficient to determine the unique parent each
node has. From the previous arguments, the parent of node u is
the unique node v such that Πv(t) is the minimum dimension
subspace that contains Πu(t). Then, the parent of node u is
the node v such that
v = argmin
w∈V : duw=du
dw.
As we will discuss in Section IV-C, collecting the subspace
information from the network nodes can be implemented
efficiently. The algorithm that determines the tree topology
reduces this information to only two “sufficient statistics”:
the dimension of each subspace du = dim(Πu), ∀u ∈ V,
and the dimension of the intersection of every two subspaces
duv = dim(Πu ∩ Πv), ∀u, v ∈ V , as described in Algo-
rithm IV.1, assuming that the conditions of Theorem 3 hold.
Algorithm IV.1: TREE({du}, {duv})
for each u ∈ V
do


if du = n
then u← S
else
{node u has parent the node v with
v = argmin
w∈V : duw=du
dw
Alg. IV.1: Find the network topology for a tree.
2) Directed v.s. Undirected Network: In a tree with a single
source, since new information can only flow from the source to
each node along a single path, whether the network is directed
or undirected makes no difference. In other words, from (6),
all vectors that a node will send to its predecessor will belong
in the subspace the predecessor already has. Thus Theorem 3
still holds for undirected networks with a common min-cut.
3) Different Min-Cuts: Assume now that the edges of the
tree have different capacities, i.e., assigned different rates. In
this case, the proof of Theorem 3 still holds, provided that the
condition in Theorem 3 is modified to
2D(G) < t < 0
n
cmax
1,
where cmax = maxv∈V cv.
We underline that this theorem would not hold without the
assumption in (3) . Without this condition, it is possible that
we cannot distinguish between nodes at same level with a
common parent as explained in the following example.
Example 2: If in the network in Figure 2, edge SA has
unit capacity, while edge AB and AC have capacity two.
In this case it is easy to see that there exists t0 such that
ΠB(t) = ΠC(t) = ΠA(t− 1), ∀t ≥ t0. Clearly in this case,
we cannot distinguish between nodes B and C with this
dissemination protocol. "
B. General Topologies
Consider now an arbitrary network topology, corresponding
to a directed acyclic graph. An intuition we can get from
examining tree structures is that, we can distinguish between
two topologies provided all node subspaces are distinct. This
is used to identify the unique parent of each node. In general
topologies, it is similarly sufficient to identify the parents of
each node, in order to learn the graph topology. The following
theorem claims that having distinct subspaces is in fact a
sufficient condition for topology identifiability over general
graphs as well.
Theorem 4: In a synchronous network employing random-
ized network coding over Fq , a sufficient condition to uniquely
identify the topology with high probability as q , 1, is that
Πu(t) 2= Πv(t) ∀ u, v ∈ V, u 2= v, (7)
9for some time t. Under this condition, we can identify the
topology by collecting global information at times t and t+1,
i.e., two consecutive static views of the network.
Proof: Assume node u has the p parents P (u) =
{u1, . . . , up}. Let Π(u1)u (t), . . . ,Π(up)u (t) denote the subspaces
node u has received from its parents up to time t, where
Πu(t) =
∑p
i=1 Π
(ui)
u (t). From construction it is clear that
Π(ui)u (t+ 1) ⊆ Πui(t).
To identify the network topology, it is sufficient to decide
which node v ∈ V is the parent that sent the subspace Π(ui)u (t)
to node u for each i, and thus find the p parents of node u.
We claim that, provided (7) holds, node u has as parent the
node v which at time t has the smallest dimension subspace
containing Π(ui)u (t + 1). Thus we can uniquely identify the
network topology, by two static views, at times t and t + 1,
as Algorithm IV.2 describes.
Indeed, let pi(ui)u (t) denote the subspace that node
u receives from parent ui at exactly time t, that
is, Π(ui)u (t+ 1) = Π(ui)u (t) + pi(ui)u (t+ 1). For each i ∈
{1, . . . , p}, if pi(ui)u (t + 1) " Πv(t) for all v ∈ V \ {ui},
clearly Π(ui)u (t+1) " Πv(t) for all v ∈ V \ {ui}, and we are
done. Otherwise, using Lemma 2 and because (7) holds, with
high probability we have pi(ui)u (t + 1) " Πv(t) for all v ∈ V
except those nodes that their subspaces contain Πui(t). So we
are done.
Note that to identify the network topology, we need to
know, for all nodes u, the dimension du ! dim(Πu(t)) of
their observed subspaces at time t, the dimension d(i)u !
dim(Π(ui)u (t+1)) for all parents ui of node u, and the dimen-
sion of the intersection of Π(ui)u (t+1) with all Πw(t), w ∈ V ,
denoted as d(i)wu ! dim(Π(ui)u (t+ 1) ∩Πw(t)). Algorithm IV.2
uses this information to infer the topology.
Algorithm IV.2: GEN({du}, {d(i)u }, {d(i)wu})
for each u ∈ V
do


if du = n
then u← S
else


for each i ∈ {1, . . . , pu}
do


node u has as parent the
node v with
v = argmin
w∈V : d
(i)
wu=d
(i)
u
dw
Alg. IV.2: Find the topology of a general network.
The sufficient conditions (7) in Theorem 4, may or may not
hold, depending on the network topology and the information
dissemination protocol. Next, we will investigate for what net-
work topologies the conditions (7) hold for the dissemination
Algorithm II.1 so that the network is identifiable.
Lemma 6: Consider two arbitrary nodes u and v, where
P (u) = {u1, . . . , upu} and P (v) = {v1, . . . , vpv} are the par-
ents of u and v respectively. Let ΠP (u)(t−1) =
∑pu
i=1Πui(t−
1), and ΠP (v)(t − 1) =
∑pv
i=1Πvi(t − 1). If Πu(t) = Πv(t)
we should have had ΠP (u)(t− 1) = ΠP (v)(t− 1) w.h.p.
Proof: Let us assume that Πu(t) = Πv(t) = Π. This
implies that if piu(t) and piv(t) are subspaces collected by
nodes u and v at time t then,
Πu(t) = Πv(t) = Π
piu(t) +Πu(t− 1) = piv(t) +Πv(t− 1).
From construction, we have Π = Πu(t) ⊆ ΠP (u)(t − 1) and
Π = Πv(t) ⊆ ΠP (v)(t− 1).
On the other hand, since for every i, we randomly chose
pi(ui)u (t) from Πui(t − 1) and since pi(ui)u (t) ⊆ Π (because
piu(t) ⊆ Π) using Lemma 2 we conclude that we should have
that Πui(t− 1) ⊆ Π which means we should have ΠP (u)(t−
1) ⊆ Π. Similarly, we should have ΠP (v)(t − 1) ⊆ Π. As a
result, with high probability, we have to have
ΠP (u)(t− 1) = ΠP (v)(t− 1) = Π,
and we are done.
Corollary 5: If Πu(t) = Πv(t) = Π for t > l we should
have had ΠP l(u)(t− l) = ΠP l(v)(t− l) = Π, w.h.p.
Proof: Consider the parents of nodes u and v as super-
nodes P (u) and P (v). Using a similar argument as stated in
Lemma 6, we can conclude that the parents of P (u) and P (v),
denoted as P 2(u) and P 2(v), should satisfy
ΠP 2(u)(t− 2) = ΠP 2(v)(t− 2) = Π.
We use this argument l times to get the result.
Lemma 7: If the dissemination protocol is in the steady
state, t ≥ Ts, we could not have Πu(t) = Πv(t) unless nodes
u and v have the same set of ancestors at some l level above
in the network.
Proof: Because t ≥ Ts, we have du(t) = dim(Πu(t)) <
n and dv(t) = dim(Πv(t)) < n. Let us assume Πu(t) =
Πv(t) = Π so we have d ! du(t) = dv(t). From the
Corollary 5 we can write
ΠP l(u)(t− l) = ΠP l(v)(t− l) = Π,
for every l ≥ 1. Increasing l, two cases may happen. First,
either P l(u) or P l(v) contains the source node S that results
in dim(ΠP l(u)(t− l)) = n or dim(ΠP l(v)(t− l)) = n which
is a contradiction since d < n. Second, nodes u and v have
the same set of ancestors at some level l.
Up to here, we have shown that assuming the dissemination
protocol is in the steady state the subspaces of two arbitrary
nodes are equal only if they have the same ancestors at some
level above in the network. The following result, Theorem 5
states sufficient conditions that make the nodes’ subspaces
different for dissemination Algorithm II.1.
Theorem 5: Suppose two arbitrary nodes u and v have the
same set of parents P l = P l(u) = P l(v) at some level l. The
following conditions are sufficient so that the dissemination
Algorithm II.1 satisfies condition (7)6:
cˆu ! min-cut(P l, u) ≤ min-cut(S, P l) ! cp,
cˆv ! min-cut(P l, v) ≤ min-cut(S, P l) ! cp.
Proof: Consider the set of nodes in P l. From the defi-
nition we know that there exists at least one path of length l
6Note that for the the min-cut cu to node u, cu ! min-cut(S, u), we have
cu = min{cˆu, cp}.
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from each node in P l to the node u. But also there might exist
paths of length less than l from some nodes in P l to u. If this
is the case, because the topology is a directed acyclic graph,
we can find a subset P ′ of the nodes in P l such that it forms a
cut for the node u and the shortest path from each node in P ′
to u is l; see Figure 3. Moreover, we have min-cut(S, P ′) = cp
and min-cut(P ′, u) = cˆu.
Now assume that P ′ = {p1, . . . , pk} such that τp1 ≤ · · · ≤
τpk . Let a1, . . . , ak, be the accumulative min-cut from S to
each node in P ′. By this we mean that a1 = cp1 and a2 is
the amount of increase in the min-cut from S by adding node
p2 and so on. We similarly consider the accumulative min-cut
values from pi to u and denote these by b1, . . . , bk. So we
have ∑kj=1 aj = cp and ∑kj=1 bj = cˆu.
From definition of the waiting times (Definition 1) we can
write
dP ′(τ1) ≥ a1 + 1,
dP ′(τ2) ≥ dP ′(τ1) + (τ2 − τ1)a1 + a2,
dP ′(τk) ≥ dP ′(τk−1) + (τk − τk−1)
k−1∑
j=1
aj + ak.
Then we have
dP l(τk) ≥ dP ′(τk)
≥ (τ2 − τ1)a1 + · · ·+ (τk − τk−1)
k−1∑
j=1
aj +
k∑
j=1
aj + 1. (8)
For du we can also write
du(τ1 + l) ≤ b1,
du(τ2 + l) ≤ du(τ1 + l) + (τ2 − τ1)min[a1, b1] + b2,
du(τk + l) ≤ du(τk−1) + (τk − τk−1)min[
k−1∑
j=1
aj ,
k−1∑
j=1
bj ] + bk,
or
du(τk + l) ≤ (τ2 − τ2)min[a1, b1]
+ · · ·+ (τk − τk−1)min[
k−1∑
j=1
aj,
k−1∑
j=1
bj] +
k∑
j=1
bj. (9)
From (8), (9) and the theorem assumptions we conclude that
du(τk + l) < dP l(τk). Now for ∆t time-slots later we write
du(τk + l +∆t)
(a)
≤ du(τk + l) + cˆu∆t
(b)
< dP l(τk) + cp∆t
(c)
= dP l(τk +∆t),
where (a) is true because u receives packets from P l with
rate at most cˆu; (b) is true because du(τk + l) < dP l(τk)
and cˆu ≤ cp; and finally (c) is true because after τk all of
the nodes in P ′ receive packets at rate equal to their min-cut
which means that P ′ (the same is true for P l) receives packets
at rate equal to its min-cut cp.
The same inequality holds for the dimension of
Πv(τk + l+∆t). Thus for time t > τk + l we cannot
DE
C
u
P (u)
A
B
P 2(u)
P ′
Fig. 3. Sets used in the proof of Theorem 5: the set P (u) contains the
parents of node u at distance l = 1; the set P 2(u) contains the set of parents
at distance l = 2; while P ′ is the subset of P 2(u) at distance no less than
l = 2.
have ΠP l(t− l) = Πu(t) and ΠP l(t− l) = Πv(t) if cˆu ≤ cp
and cˆv ≤ cp. So using Corollary 5 we are done.
Intuitively, what Theorem 5 tell us is that, if for a node u
there exists a path that does not belong in any cut between the
source and another node v, then nodes u and v will definitely
have distinct subspaces. The only case where nodes u and
v may have the same subspace is, if they have a common
set of parents, a common cut. Even then, they would need
both of them to receive all the innovative information that
flows through the common cut at the same time. Note that the
condition of Theorem 5 are also necessary for identifiably for
the special case of tree topologies, such as the topology in
Figure 2.
C. Practical Considerations
We here argue that our proposed scheme can lead to a
practical protocol, where nodes passively collect information
during the dissemination process, and send once a small
amount of information to the central node in charge of the
topology inference. In particular, we assume that the nodes
follow the information dissemination protocol and at some
point the central node query them to report the subspaces they
gather at a specific7 time t.
We now calculate the communication cost (total number
of bits required to be transmitted to a central node) of
the proposed passive inference algorithm. Each node has to
transmit at most 2∆i(G) subspaces to the central node where
∆i(G) is the maximum in-degree of nodes in the network.
There are ϑ nodes in the network so 2ϑ∆i(G) subspace have
to be transmitted. The total number of subspaces of ΠS (which
itself is an n-dimensional space) is
n∑
i=1
[
n
i
]
q
≈
n∑
i=1
qi(n−i) ≈ qn
2/4,
7We assume the query is send before time t actually occurs; Also note
that if the number of source packets n is much larger than the min-cut to
each node, and if we have an estimate for ∆i(G) (the maximum in-degree
of nodes in the network), a central node can with high probability select at
time t in steady state. A node can also send a feedback message to inform
the central node if it is not at steady state at time t.
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where [ni]q is the Gaussian number, the number of i-dimensional subspaces of an n-dimensional space. To approx-
imate the Gaussian number we use [32, Lemma 1]; note that
the approximation holds for large q.
So to encode one of the subspace of ΠS we need approx-
imately n24 log2 q bits. As a result, the total number of bits
need to be transmitted to the central node is at most
2n2∆i(G)ϑ
4
log2 q.
Clearly, the complexity depends on the size of n, the
number of packets that the source transmits. In our work we
assume that n is large enough, so that the network enters in
steady state; on the other hand, other considerations such as
decoding complexity at network nodes, would require n to take
moderate values. Note that, for our algorithm to work, (i.e., to
sample the network while in the steady state) we only require
that n = 2βcmaxD(G) (Corollary 3), where β > 1 is some
constant that determines how many time slots the network is
in the steady state. If n has such a size, the maximum number
of bits that need to be transmitted per node (communication
cost per node) is
Rcom-cost/ND ≈ 2β2c2maxD(G)
2∆i(G) log2 q bits.
In the above equation β, cmax, and ∆i(G) are some constants.
The only parameter that depends on the network size is
D(G). However for the most of practical content distribution
networks the longest path of network is kept small to ensure
a good connectivity between nodes in the network (see for
example [34]).
To give a specific example for a possible communication
cost, let us consider a practical scenario where q = 28,
cmax = 1, β2 = 5, ∆i(G) = 5, and D(G) = 10. Then we have
Rcom-cost/nd ≈ 4 kilobytes. In contrast, in a practical dissemina-
tion scenario (e.g., video streaming) we would disseminate a
large number of information packets each possibly as large
as a few megabytes; thus the overhead of the topological
information would not be significant.
V. LOCATING BYZANTINE ATTACKERS
In this section we explore a problem that is dual to topology
inference: given complete knowledge of the topology, we
leverage subspace properties to identify the location of a
malicious Byzantine attacker.
In a network coded system, the adversarial nodes in the
network disrupt the normal operation of the information flow
by inserting erroneous packets into the network. This can be
done by inserting spurious data packets into their outgoing
edges. One way in which these erroneous packets can be
prevented from disrupting information flow is by reducing the
transmission rate to below the min-cut of the network, and
using the redundancy to protect against errors; [20], [21], [22].
One such technique, using subspaces to code information was
proposed in [17]. In this approach, the source sends a basis
of the subspace corresponding to the message. In the absence
of errors, the linear operations of the intermediate nodes do
not alter the sent subspace, and hence the receiver decodes the
message by collecting the basis of the transmitted subspace.
A malicious attacker inserts vectors that do not belong in
the transmitted subspace. Therefore, if the message codebook
uses subspaces that are “far enough” apart (according to an
appropriately defined distance measure), then one can correct
these errors [17]. Note that in this technique, we do not need
any knowledge of the network topology for the error correction
mechanism. All that is needed is that the intermediate nodes
do not alter the transmitted subspace (which can be done if
they do linear operations).
The approach of this section to locating adversaries uses the
framework developed in the previous sections, where it was
shown that under randomized network coding, the subspaces
gathered by the nodes of the network provide information
about the topology. Therefore, the basic premise in this section
is to use the structure of the erroneous subspace inserted by
the adversary to reveal information about its location, when
we already know the network topology.
A. Problem Formulation
Consider a network represented as a directed acyclic graph
G = (V,E). We have a source, sending information to r
receivers, and one (or more) Byzantine adversaries, located
at intermediate nodes of the network. We assume complete
knowledge of the network topology, and consider the source
and the receivers to be trustworthy (authenticated) nodes, that
are guaranteed not to be adversaries.
Suppose source S sends n vectors, that span an n-
dimensional subspace ΠS of the space F!q, where we assume
q , 1. In particular, in this section we will consider (without
loss of generality) subspace coding, where ΠS belongs to a
codebook C, ΠS ∈ C designed to correct network errors and
erasures [17].
In the absence of any adversaries in the network each
receiver Ri, i = 1, . . . , r, can decode the exact space ΠS . Now
assume that there is an adversary, Eve, who attacks one of the
nodes in the network by combining a δ-dimensional subspace
ΠE with its incoming space and sending the resulting vectors
to its children. Then the receiver Ri collects some linearly
independent vectors that span a subspace ΠRi . We can write
ΠRi = Hi(ΠS +ΠE),
where Hi(Π) is a linear operator. This operator models the
linear transformation that the network induces on the inserted
source and adversary packets.
We assume that the receiver is able to at least detect that a
Byzantine attack is under way. Moreover, we assume that the
receiver is able to decode the subspace ΠS that the source has
sent. This might be, either because the receiver has correctly
decoded the sent message (i.e., using code construction from
[17]), or, because after detecting the presence of an attack has
requested the source subspace through a secure channel from
the source node.
We can restrict the Byzantine attack in several ways, de-
pending on the edges where the attack is launched, the number
of corrupted vectors inserted, and the vertices (network nodes)
that the adversary has access to. In this section we will
distinguish between the cases where
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I. there is a single Byzantine attacker located in a vertex
of the network, and
II. there are multiple independent attackers, located on
different vertices, that act without coordinating with each
other.
Moreover, we assume that each attacker located on a single
vertex is able to corrupt any outgoing edges by inserting
arbitrary erroneous information.
Now, we are interested in understanding under what condi-
tions we can uniquely identify the attacker’s location (or, up
to what uncertainty we can identify the attacker), under the
above scenarios.
B. The Case of a Single Adversary
In this section we focus on the case where we want to locate
a Byzantine adversary, Eve, controlling a single vertex of the
network graph.
In §V-B1 we illustrate the limitation of using only the
information the receivers have observed along with the knowl-
edge of the topology, to locate the adversary. This motivates
requiring additional information from the intermediate nodes
related to the subspaces observed by them. In §V-B2, we
show that such additional information allows us to localize
the adversary either uniquely or within an ambiguity of at
most two nodes.
1) Identification using only Topological Information: In
order to illustrate the ideas, we will examine the case where the
corrupted packets are inserted on a single edge of the network,
say edge eA. The extension to the cases where multiple edges
get corrupted is easy.
Since each receiver R knows the subspaces {Π(i)R } it has
received from its | In(R)| parents, it knows whether what it
received is corrupted or not (a subspace of ΠS or not). Using
this, we can infer some information regarding topological
properties that the edge eA should satisfy. In particular we
have the following result, Lemma 8.
Lemma 8: Let Pe denote the set of paths8 starting from
the source and ending at edge e. Then, if EC is the set of
incoming edges to receivers that bring corrupted packets, while
ES the set of incoming edges to receivers that only bring
source information, the edge eA belongs in the set of edges
EA, with
EA !
{ ⋂
e∈EC
Pe −
⋃
e∈ES
Pe
}
.
Proof: If R receives corrupted vectors from an incoming
edge e then there exists at least one path that connects eA to
e. Then eA is part of at least one path in Pe.
Conversely, if a receiver R does not receive corrupted
packets from an incoming edge e, then eA does not form part
of any path in Pe. That is, there does not exist a path that
connects eA to e.
The following example illustrates this approach.
8In the following, we are going to equivalently think of Pe as the set of
all edges that take part in these paths.
Example 3: Consider the network in Figure 4, and assume
that R1 receives corrupted packets from edge DR1 and uncor-
rupted packets from AR1, while R2 receives only uncorrupted
packets. Then EA = {DR1} and the attacker is located on
S
A
B
C
DR1 R2
Fig. 4. The source S distributes packets to receivers R1 and R2.
node D. "
In Example 3, we were able to exactly identify the location
of the adversary, because the set EA contained a single
edge, and node R1 is trustworthy. It is easy to find network
configurations where EA contains multiple edges, or in fact
all the network edges, and thus we can no longer identify the
attacker. The following example illustrates one such case.
Example 4: Consider the line network shown in Figure 5.
Suppose the attacker is node A. If the receiver R sees a
corrupted packet, then using just the topology, the attacker
could be any of the other nodes in the line network. This
illustrates that just the topology and receiver information could
lead to large ambiguity in the location of the attacker. "
Therefore, Example 4 motivates the ideas examined in
§V-B2 which obtain additional information and utilize the
structural properties of the subspaces observed.
2) Identification using Information from all Network Nodes:
We will next discuss algorithms where a central authority,
which we will call controller, requests from all nodes in the
network to report some additional information, related to the
subspaces they have received from their parents. The adversary
could send inaccurate information to the controller, but the
other nodes report the information accurately. Our task is to
design the question to the nodes such that we can locate the
adversary, despite its possible misdirection.
The controller may ask the nodes of the following types of
information, listed in decreasing order of complexity:
Information 1: Each node v sends all subspaces Π(i)v it
has received from its parents, where Πv =
∑
i∈P (v)Π
(i)
v .
Information 2: Each node v sends a randomly chosen
vector from each of the received subspaces Π(i)v (| In(v)|
vectors in total).
Information 2 is motivated by the following observation
made by Lemma 2: let Π1 and Π2 be two subspaces of Fnq ,
and assume that y be a randomly selected vector from Π1.
Then, for q , 1, y ∈ Π2 if and only if Π1 ⊆ Π2. Thus, a
randomly selected vector from Πv allows to check whether
Πv ⊆ ΠS or not.
In fact, we will show in this section that for a single
adversary it is sufficient to use9 Information 2, and classify
9Using Information 2, these statements are made with high probability, i.e.,
the probability goes to one as field size q →∞.
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the edges of the network by simply testing whether the
information flowing through each edge is a subspace of ΠS
or not (i.e., is corrupted or not).
S A B C D R
Fig. 5. The source S sends information to receiver R over a line network.
Theorem 6: Using Information 1, by splitting the network
edges into corrupted and uncorrupted sets, we can narrow the
location of the adversary up to a set of at most two nodes.
With Information 2, the same result holds w.h.p.
Proof: The network is a directed acyclic graph, so we
can impose a partial order on the edges of the graph, such that
e1 > e2 if e1 is an ancestor edge of e2 (i.e., there exists a path
from e1 to e2). Then having Information 1 or Information 2,
we can divide the edges of the network into two sets: the set
of edges EC through which are reported to flow corrupted
subspaces, and the remaining edges ES through which the
source information flows so we have E = ES ∪EC and ES ∩
EC = ∅. Note that all the outgoing edges from the source
belong in ES .
Nodes in the network perform randomized network coding
so every node that receives corrupted information on at least
one of its incoming edges makes all of the outgoing edges
polluted w.h.p. Let tv be the number of corrupted outgoing
edges of a node v where we have 1 ≤ tv ≤ |Out(v)|. For
each node v that is not an adversary we have either tv = 0 or
tv = |Out(v)|.
Now, to prove the theorem we consider the following
possible cases.
1) If the adversary Eve corrupts tA outgoing edges where
1 < tA < |Out(A)| we can identify the node she has
attacked uniquely because its behavior is different from
all other nodes.
2) If she corrupts all of its outgoing edges, tA = |Out(A)|,
then she can fraud us by declaring that one of the node’s
incoming edges is corrupted. If A declares more than
one of the incoming edges as corrupted we can find its
location uniquely.
3) She can also corrupt only one of its outgoing edges,
tA = 1, and pretends that its children is in fact the
adversary by declaring all of its incoming edges bring
non-corrupted information. She cannot declare that any
of its incoming edges are polluted since then we may
find its location uniquely.
In all of the above cases the adversary is on the boundary
of two sets ES and EC and the ambiguity about its location
is at most withing a set of two vertices where this set contains
those two vertices that are connected by the corrupted edge
with highest order among all corrupted edges (recall that we
can compare all of the corrupted edges using the imposed
partial order).
C. The Case of Multiple Adversaries
In the case of a single adversary, it was sufficient to divide
the set of edges into two sets, ES and EC , as described in the
previous section. In the presence of multiple adversaries, this
may no longer be sufficient. An additional dimension is that
realistically, we may not know the exact number of adversaries
present. In the following, we discuss a number of algorithms,
that offer weaker or stronger identifiability guarantees.
1) Identification using only Topological Information: The
approach in §V-B1 can be directly extended in the case
of multiple adversaries, but again, offers no identifiability
guarantees.
Example 5: Consider again the network in Figure 4, and
assume that R1 receives corrupted packets only from edge
DR1 while R2 receives corrupted packets only from edge
DR2. Then EA = {AD,CD,DR1, DR2} and (depending on
our assumptions) we may have,
- a single adversary located on node D,
- two adversaries, located on nodes A and C,
- two adversaries, located on nodes A and D, or nodes C
and D, or
- three adversaries, located on nodes A, C, and D.
"
2) Identification using Splitting: Similarly to §V-B2, using
Information 1 or Information 2, we can divide the set of
edges into two sets ES and EC , depending on whether the
information flowing through each edge belongs in ΠS or
not. Depending on the network topology, we may be able to
uniquely identify the location of the attackers. However, this
approach, although it guarantees to find at least one of the
attackers (within an uncertainty of at most two nodes), does
not necessarily find all the attackers, even if we know their
exact number.
To show this let us state the following definition.
Definition 4: We say that node v is in the shadow of an
adversary node A, if there exists a path that connects every
incoming edge of v to a corrupted outgoing edge of A.
Then we have the following result.
Lemma 9: By splitting the network edges into two sets ES
and EC we cannot identify adversarial nodes that are in the
shadow of an adversary A.
Proof: This is because if an attacker is in the shadow of
another attacker, it may corrupt only already corrupted vectors
and thus not incur a detectable effect. So we cannot distinguish
between an attacker and a normal node that are in the shadow
of A.
The following example illustrates these points.
Example 6: For the example in Figure 4, assume that each
attacker corrupts all its outgoing edges, and consider the
following two situations:
1) Assume that nodes A and C are attackers. If A
reports truthfully while C lies we get EC =
{AD,AR1, DR1, DR2, BC,CR2, CD}, which allows
to identify the attackers.
2) Assume that nodes B and D are attackers. Then we say
that node D is in the shadow of node B, as it corrupts
only already packets corrupted by B. Indeed, if EC =
{SB,BA,BC,AD,AR1, DR1, DR2, BC,CR2, CD},
knowing that the source is trustworthy, we can infer that
node B is an attacker. However, any of the nodes A,
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C, and D can equally probably be the second attacker.
All these nodes are in the shadow of node B.
"
Theorem 7: Using Information 1 it is possible to narrow
down the location of those adversaries that have the highest
order in the network using the splitting method. The same
result holds for Information 2 w.h.p.
Proof: As stated in the proof of Theorem 6 we can impose
a partial order on the edges of the network graph. Then, by
using Information 1 or Information 2 we may split the network
edges into two sets ES and EC .
Because every node in the network performs randomized
network coding, there are only two possibilities for each
adversary to corrupt its outgoing edges and report subspaces
for its incoming edges such that it is not located uniquely.
These are as follows:
1) She corrupts some (or all) of its outgoing edges but
reports its incoming edges as uncorrupted.
2) She corrupts all of its outgoing edges and reports some
(at least one) of its incoming edges as corrupted.
Now, let us consider the set of all the corrupted edges that
have highest order with respect to other corrupted edges and
cannot be compared against each other. For each of the above
cases there should be at least one adversary connected to every
edge in this set.
3) Identification using Subset Relationships: In this subsec-
tion we develop a new algorithm to find the adversaries which
is based on Information 1.
For each node u ∈ V , let P (u) = {u1, . . . , upu} denote
the set of parent nodes of u. We are going to treat P (u) as a
super-node, and use the notation ΠP (u) =
∑pu
i=1Πui for the
union of the subspaces of all nodes in P (u). Also recall that
Π(u)v denotes the subspace received by node v from node u.
Our last algorithm checks, for every node u ∈ V , whether
Π(u)v
?
⊆ ΠP (u) ∀v ∈ V : euv ∈ E. (10)
Then we have the following result, Theorem 8.
Theorem 8: If the pairwise distance between adversaries is
greater than two, it is possible to find the exact number as
well as the location of the attackers (within an uncertainty of
parent-children sets) using the subset method.
Proof: First, let us focus on a single adversary case where
A ∈ V is the node attacked by the adversary. Then we will
generalize the idea for an arbitrary number of adversaries.
If (10) is satisfied for all children of u, we know that node
u is not an adversary. If the relationship is not satisfied, that is
Π(u)v " ΠP (u) for at least one child of u, we consider node
u as a potential candidate for being an adversary. For sure we
know that
Π(A)v " ΠP (A) ∀v ∈ V : eAv ∈ E,
but depending on the subspace that the adversary reports, the
relation (10) may not be also satisfied for other nodes. Based
on what the adversary reports there would be two possible
cases.
If the adversary pretends that it is a trustworthy node (just
declares the received subspace from its parents) the above
relation also fails for the children of A who receive corrupted
subspaces. On the other hand, if the adversary tells the truth
and declares its corrupted subspace, we have
Π(u)A " ΠP (u) ∀u ∈ V : uA ∈ E.
Thus the ambiguity set we have identified includes the ad-
versary and its parents and/or its children depending on the
adversary’s report.
Repeating this procedure for every node in the network,
we can identify sets of potential adversaries. We know that
depending on the adversaries action there exists ambiguity
in finding their exact location. In fact in the worst case, the
uncertainty is within a set of nodes including the adversary, its
parents and its children. So if the distance between adversaries
is greater than two, the “uncertainty” sets do not overlap. In
this case we can easily distinguish between different adver-
saries.
This procedure allows to identify adversaries (within the
mentioned parent-children ambiguity set), even if one is in the
shadow of another, and even if we do not know their exact
number, provided they are “far enough” in the network to be
distinguishable.
VI. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR TOPOLOGY
MANAGEMENT
In §IV, we demonstrated that using subspaces of all nodes,
we can infer the network topology under certain conditions. In
this section, we will show that even from what a single node
observes, it is possible to get some information regarding the
bottlenecks and clustering in the network.
Leveraging this observation in the context of P2P networks,
we propose algorithms that use this information in a distributed
peer-initiated manner to avoid bottlenecks and clustering.
A. Problem Statement and Motivation
In peer-to-peer networks that employ network coding for
content distribution (see for example Avalanche [3], [4]) we
want to create and maintain a well-connected network topol-
ogy, to allow the information to flow fast between the nodes;
however, this is not straightforward. Peer-to-peer networks
are very dynamically changing networks, where hundreds of
nodes may join and leave the network within seconds. All
nodes in this network are connected to a small number of
neighbors (e.g., four to eight). An arriving node is allocated
neighbors among the active participating nodes10, which ac-
cept the solicited connection unless they have already reached
their maximum number of neighbors. As a result, nodes that
arrive at around the same time tend to get connected to each
other, since they are all simultaneously available and looking
for neighbors. That is, we have formation of clusters and
bottlenecks in the network.
To avoid this problem, one method adopted in protocols is to
ask all nodes to periodically drop one neighbor and reconnect
to a new one among an active peers list. This randomized
10This is usually done by a central node which we call it (following
Avalanche [3], [4]) “registrat”. This is the central authority that keeps the
list of all nodes in the network and gives every new node a set of neighbors.
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Fig. 6. The source S distributes packets to the peers A, B, C and D over
the overlay network (a), that uses the underlying physical network (b).
rewiring results in a fixed average number of reconnections per
node independently of how good or bad is the formed network
topology. Thus to achieve a good, on the average, performance
in terms of breaking clusters, it entails a much larger number
of rewiring than required, and unnecessary topology changes.
An alternative approach is to have peers initiate topology
rewirings when they detect they are in a cluster. Clearly
a central node could keep some structural information, i.e.,
keep track of the current network topology, and use it to
make more educated choices of neighbor allocations. However,
the information this central node can collect only reflects
the overlay network topology, and is oblivious to bandwidth
constraints from the underlying physical links. Acquiring
bandwidth information for the underlying physical links at the
central node requires costly estimation techniques over large
and heterogeneous networks, and steers towards a centralized
network operation. We will argue that such bottlenecks can
be inferred almost passively in a peer-initiated manner, thus
alleviating these drawbacks.
Here, we will show that the coding vectors the peers receive
from their neighbors can be used to passively infer bottleneck
information. This allows individual nodes to initiate topology
changes to correct problematic connections. In particular, peers
by keeping track of the coding vectors they receive can detect
problems in both the overlay topology and the underlying
physical links. The following example illustrates these points.
Example 7: Consider the toy network depicted in Fig-
ure 6(a) where the edges correspond to logical (overlay
network) links. The source S has n packets to distribute to
four peers. Nodes A, B and C are directly connected to the
source S, and also among themselves with logical links, while
node D is connected to nodes A, B and C. In this overlay
network, there exist three edge-disjoint paths between source
and any other nodes.
Assume now (as shown in Figure 6(b)) that the logical links
SA, SB, SC share the bandwidth of the same underlying
physical link, which forms a bottleneck between the source and
the remaining nodes of the network. As a result, assume the
bandwidth on each of these links is only 1/3 of the bandwidth
of the remaining links. A central node (registrat), even if
it keeps track of the complete logical network structure by
querying each node asking about its neighbors, is oblivious
to the existence of the bottleneck and the asymmetry between
the link bandwidths.
Node D however, can infer this information by observing
the coding vectors it receives from its neighbors A, B and
C. Indeed, when node A receives a coded packet from the
source, it will forward a linear combination of the packets it
has already collected to nodes B and C and D. Now each
of the nodes B and C, once they receive the packet from
node A, they also attempt to send a coded packet to node D.
But these packets will not bring new information to node D,
because they will belong in the linear span of coding vectors
that node D has already received. Similarly, when nodes B
and C receive a new packet from the source, node D will
end up being offered three coded packets, one from each of
its neighbors, and only one of the three will bring to node D
new information. "
More formally, the coding vectors nodes A, B and C will
collect will effectively span the same subspace; thus the coded
packets they will offer to node D to download will belong in
significantly overlapping subspaces and will thus be redundant
(we formalize these intuitive arguments in §VI-B). NodeD can
infer from this passively collected information that there is a
bottleneck between nodes A, B, C and the source, and can
thus initiate a connection change.
B. Theoretical Framework
Here we use the same notations introduced in §II. For
simplicity we will assume that the network is synchronous11.
Nodes are allowed to transmit linear combinations of their
received packets only at clock ticks, at a rate equal to the
adjacent link bandwidth.
Now we use the framework of §III to investigate the
information that we can obtain from the local information of a
node’s subspace. From notations defined in §II, we know that
for an arbitrary node v we can write
Πv(t) =
∑
i∈P (v)
Π(i)v (t).
We are interested in understanding what information we can
infer from these received subspaces Π(i)v , i ∈ P (v), about
bottlenecks in the network. For example, the overlap of
subspaces from the neighbors reveals some information about
bottlenecks. Therefore, we need to show that such overlaps
occur due to topological properties and not due to particular
random linear combinations chosen by the network code.
Let us assume that the subspaces Π(i)v a node v receives
from its set of parents P (v) have an intersection of dimension
d. Then we have the following observations.
Observation 1: The subspaces Π(i)v , i ∈ P (v), of the neigh-
bors have an intersection of size at least d (see Corollary 1).
Observation 2: The min-cut between the set of nodes P (v)
and the source is smaller than the min-cut between the node
v and set P (v) (see Theorem 2).
In the following, we will discuss algorithms that use such
observations for topology management.
11This is not essential for the algorithms but simplifies the theoretical
analysis.
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C. Algorithms
Our peer-initiated algorithms for topology management con-
sist of three tasks:
1) Each peer decides whether it is satisfied with its con-
nection or not, using a decision criterion.
2) An unsatisfied peer sends a rewiring request, that can
contain different levels of information, either directly to
the registrat, or to its neighbors (these are the only nodes
the peer can communicate with).
3) Finally, the registrat, having received rewiring requests,
allocates neighbors to nodes to be reconnected.
The decision criterion can capitalize on the fact that over-
lapping received subspaces indicate an opportunity for im-
provement. For example, in the first algorithm we propose
(Algorithm 1), a node can decide it is not satisfied with a
particular neighbor, if it receives k > 0, non-innovative coding
vectors from it, where k is a parameter to be decided. Then
it has each unsatisfied node directly contact the registrat and
specify the neighbor it would like to change. The registrat
randomly selects a new neighbor. This algorithm, as we
demonstrate through simulation results, may lead to more
rewirings than necessary: indeed, all nodes inside a cluster
may attempt to change their neighbors, while it would have
been sufficient for a fraction of them to do so.
Our second algorithm (Algorithm 2) uses a different deci-
sion criterion: for every two neighbors u and v, each peer w
computes the rate at which the received joint space Π(u)w +Π(v)w
and intersection space Π(u)w ∩ Π(v)w increases. If the ratio
between these two rates becomes greater than a threshold
T , the node decides it would like to change one of the
two neighbors. However, instead of directly contacting the
registrat, it uses a decentralized voting method that attempts to
further reduce the number of reconnections. Then the registrat
randomly selects and allocates one new neighbor for the nodes
have sent rewiring request.
Our last proposed algorithm (Algorithm 3), while still peer-
initiated and decentralized, relies more than the two previous
ones in the computational capabilities of the registrat. The
basic observation is that, nodes in the same cluster will not
only receive overlapping subspaces from their parents, but
moreover, they will end up collecting subspaces with very
small distance (this follows from Theorem 2 and Corollary 1
and is also illustrated through simulation results in §VI-D; see
Figure 8). Each unsatisfied peer v sends a rewiring request
to the registrat, indicating to the registrat the subspace Πv it
has collected. A peer can decide it is not satisfied using for
example the same criterion as in Algorithm 2.
The registrat waits for a short time period, to collect requests
from a number of dissatisfied nodes. These are the nodes
of the network that have detected they are inside clusters. It
then calculates the distance between the identified subspaces
to decide which peers belong in the same cluster. While
exact such calculations can be computationally demanding,
in practice, the registrat can use one of the many hashing
algorithms to efficiently do so. Finally the registrat breaks the
clusters by rewiring a small number of nodes in each cluster.
The allocated new neighbors are either nodes that belong in
different clusters, or, nodes that have not send a rewiring
request at all.
We will compare our proposed algorithms against the
Random Rewiring currently employed by many peer-to-peer
protocols (e.g., see [3], [4], [34]). In this algorithm, each
time a peer receives a packet, with probability p contacts the
registrat and asks to change a neighbor. The registrat randomly
selects which neighbor to change, and randomly allocates a
new neighbor from the active peer nodes.
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Fig. 7. A sample of topology with three clusters: cluster 1 contains nodes
1–10, cluster 2 nodes 11–20 and cluster 3 nodes 21–30.
D. Simulation Results
For our simulation results we will start from randomly
generated topologies similar to Figure 7, that consists of 30
nodes connected into three distinct clusters. The source is
node 1, and belongs in the first cluster. The bottleneck links
are indicated with arrows (and thus indicate the underlying
physical link structure). Our first set of simulation results
depicted in Figure 8 show that the subspaces within each
cluster are very similar, while the subspaces across clusters
are significantly different, where we use the distance measure
DS(·, ·) defined in (2). These results indicate that knowledge
of these subspaces will allow the registrat to accurately detect
and break clusters (Algorithm 3).
Our second set of simulation results considers again topolo-
gies with three clusters: cluster 1 has 15 nodes and contains the
source, cluster 2 has also 15 nodes, while the number of nodes
in cluster 3 increases from 15 to 250. During the simulations
we assume that the registrat keeps the nodes’ degree between
2 and 5, with an average degree of 3.5. All edges correspond
to unit capacity links.
We compare the performance of the three proposed algo-
rithms in §VI-C with random rewiring. We implemented these
algorithms as follows. For random rewiring, every time a
node receives a packet it changes one of its neighbors with
probability p = 8500 . For Algorithm 1, we use a parameter
of k = 10, and check whether the non-innovative packets
received exceed this value every four received packets. For
Algorithm 2, every node checks the ratio of the dimensions
of the intersection and the joint space of subspaces received
from each pair of neighbors using the threshold value T = 1.
Finally for Algorithm 3, we assume that nodes use the same
criterion as in Algorithm 2 to decide whether they form part
of a cluster, again with T = 1. Dissatisfied nodes send their
observed subspaces to the registrat. The registrat assigns nodes
u and v in the same cluster if dS(Πu,Πv) ≤ 7.
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Fig. 8. Simulation results for the topology in Figure 7, with bottleneck link capacity values equal to 0.1 (left) and 1 (right).
Table I compares all algorithms with respect to the average
collection time, defined as the difference between the time a
peer receives the first packet and the time it can decode all
packets, and averaged over all peers. All algorithms perform
similarly, indicating that all algorithms result in breaking the
clusters. It is important to note that the average collection
time is in terms of number of exchanges needed and does not
account for the delays incurred due to rewiring. We compare
the number of such rewirings needed next.
Figure 9 plots the average number of rewirings each algo-
rithm employs. Random rewiring incurs a number of rewirings
proportional to the number of P2P nodes, and independently
from the underlying network topology. Our proposed algo-
rithms on the other hand, adapt to the existence and size
of clusters. Algorithm 3 leads to the smallest number of
rewirings. Algorithm 2 leads to a larger number of rewirings,
partly due to that the new neighbors are chosen randomly
and not in a manner that necessarily breaks the clusters.
The behavior of algorithm 1 is interesting. This algorithm
rewires any node that has received more than k non-innovative
packets. Consider cluster 3, whose size we increase for the
simulations. If k is small with respect to the cluster size, then
a large number of nodes will collect close to k non-innovative
packets; thus a large number of nodes will ask for rewirings.
Moreover, even after rewirings that break the cluster occur,
some nodes will still collect linearly dependent information
and ask for additional rewirings. As cluster 3 increases in size,
the information disseminates more slowly within the cluster.
Nodes in the border, close to the bottleneck links, will now be
the ones to first ask for rewirings, long before other nodes in
the network collect a large number of non-innovative packets.
Thus once the clusters are broken, no new rewirings will be
requested. This desirable behavior of Algorithm 1 manifests
itself for large clusters; for small clusters, such as cluster 2, the
second algorithm for example achieves a better performance
using less reconnections.
TABLE I
AVERAGE COLLECTION TIME
Topology Random Algo 1 Algo 2 Algo 3
15–15–20 20.98 22.14 20.57 20.39
15–15–40 18.72 21.13 19.36 19.47
15–15–70 18.88 21.54 18.97 19.54
15–15–100 18.6 21.48 18.91 21.42
15–15–150 19.56 20.85 19.96 20.18
15–15–250 18.79 19.8 19.18 18.99
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Fig. 9. Average number of rewirings, for a topology with three clusters:
cluster 1 has 15 nodes, cluster 2 has 15 nodes, while the number of nodes
in cluster 3 increases from 20 to 250 as described in Table I.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this work we explored the properties of subspaces each
node collects in networks that employ randomized network
coding and found that there exists an intricate relationship
between the structure of the network and these properties.
This observation led us to utilize these relationships in several
different applications. As the first application, we studied the
conditions under which we can passively infer the network
topology during content distribution. We showed that these
conditions are not very restrictive and hold for a general
class of information dissemination protocols. As our second
application, which in some sense is the dual of the previous
problem, we focused on locating Byzantine attackers in the
network. We studied and formulated this problem and found
that for the single adversary we can identify the adversary
within an uncertainty of two nodes. For the case of mul-
tiple adversaries, we discussed a number of algorithms and
conditions under which we can guarantee identifiability. For
our last application, we investigated the relation between the
bottlenecks in a logical network and the subspaces received
at a specific network node. We leveraged our observations to
propose decentralized peer-initiated algorithms for rewiring in
P2P systems to avoid clustering in a cost-efficient manner, and
evaluated our algorithms through simulations results.
The applications studied in this paper demonstrate ad-
vantages of using randomized network coding for network
management and control, that are additional to throughput
benefits. These are just a few examples and we believe that
there exist a lot more applications where we can use the
subspace properties developed in this work. We hope that these
properties will become part of a toolbox that can be used to
develop applications for systems that employ network coding
techniques.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 1: First, let us fix a basis for ΠS . Then
choosingm vector uniformly at random from ΠS is equivalent
to choose an m× n matrix A uniformly at random from Fq
and construct Π = 〈A〉 with respect to this fixed basis.
It is well known (e.g., see [35]) that the number of different
m × n matrices A with rank 0 ≤ k ≤ min[m,n] over Fq is
equal to
Nm,n(k) ! q
(m+n−k)k
k−1∏
i=0
(1− qi−n)(1− qi−m)
(1− qi−k)
.
So we can write
P [dim(Π) = k] =
Nm,n(k)
qmn
.
Then using the Taylor series 11−# = 1+(+(2+· · · for |(| < 1,
choosing ( = q−1, we can write
Pr[dim(Π) = k] = q−(m−k)(n−k)[1−O(q−1)].
By setting k = min[m,n] we are done.
Proof of Lemma 2: The probability that all m vectors
are in the intersection is
P [Π′1 ⊂ Π2] =
(
qd12
qd1
)m
= q(d12−d1)m,
which is of order O (q−m) provided that Π1 " Π2 , i.e., d12 <
d1.
Proof of Lemma 3: Let v1, . . . ,vm be the vectors chosen
randomly from ΠS to construct Π, i.e., Π = 〈v1, . . . ,vm〉.
Then construct the sequence of subspaces Π(i), i = 0, . . . ,m,
as follows. First, set Π(0) ! Πk and then define Π(i) for
i 2= 0 recursively, Π(i) = Π(i − 1) + 〈vi〉. We also define
d(i) ! dim(Π(i)), i = 0, . . . ,m. From Lemma 2, by choosing
Π1 = ΠS , Π2 = Π(i − 1) and m = 1 we deduce that d(i) =
d(i−1)+1 with probability 1−O (q−1), unless d(i−1) = n.
Now we consider two cases. First, if m + k ≤ n then we
have dim(Π+Πk) = k+m or equivalently dim(Π∩Πk) = 0
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with high probability, i.e., 1−O (q−1). Secondly, when m+
k > n we have dim(Π+Πk) = n with probability 1−O
(
q−1
).
From Lemma 1 we have dim(Π) = min[m,n] w.h.p. So we
have dim(Π ∩ Πk) = dim(Πk) + dim(Π) − dim(Πk +Π) =
k +min[m,n]− n.
Combining these two cases we can write
dim(Π ∩ Πk) = (k +min[m,n]− n)
+,
w.h.p., which completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1: Let us defineΠ12 = Π1∩Π2, where
d12 = dim(Π12). Using Lemma 3, and taking ΠS = Π1 and
Πk = Π12, we have
dim(Πˆ1 ∩Π12) = min
[
d12, (m1 − (d1 − d12))
+
]
,
with probability 1−O (q−1). Now, we can write
P
[
dˆ12 = α
]
=
P
[
dˆ12 = α| dim(Πˆ1 ∩ Π12) = β
]
P
[
dim(Πˆ1 ∩ Π12) = β
]
+P
[
dˆ12 = α| dim(Πˆ1 ∩ Π12) 2= β
]
P
[
dim(Πˆ1 ∩Π12) 2= β
]
,
where dˆ12 = dim(Πˆ1 ∩ Πˆ2). Substituting β =
min [d12, (m1 − (d1 − d12))+] we obtain
P
[
dˆ12 = α
]
=
P
[
dˆ12 = α| dim(Πˆ1 ∩ Π12) = β
] (
1−O
(
q−1
))
+O
(
q−1
)
.
Selecting α properly and using Lemma 3 one more time, we
get
P
[
dˆ12 = α
]
= 1−O
(
q−1
)
,
where α = min[β, (m2 − (d2 − β))+], which completes the
proof.
Proof of Theorem 1: To prove the theorem, it is sufficient
to show that (5) is valid for one specific i with high probability.
This is sufficient because if pi is the probability that Π is in
general position with respect to each Πi, i = 1, . . . , r, then
the probability that Π is in general position with the whole
family is lower bounded by 1−∑ri=1(1− pi).
Now by applying Lemma 3, we know that pi = 1−O
(
q−1
)
which completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 4: Here we assume that n is very large.
Then in Corollary 3 we will derive a sufficient condition on
the largeness of n.
Let v be the node that has the longest path to the source S.
Because of Definition 1 we can write Ts ≤ τv . Then we may
upper bound τv as follows
τv ≤ 2 + max
u∈P (v)
τu,
where P (v) is the set of parents of v. Now we can repeat the
above argument until we reach the source S. So finally we
have
τv ≤ 2D(G),
which leads to the lemma’s assertion.
Proof of Lemma 5: Let us write
dim(piu(1) ∩ Πv(j))
(a)
= dim (piu(1) ∩ (Πv(j) ∩ Π(0)))
(b)
= dim(piu(1) ∩ piv(1))
(c)
= min[d0, (ku(1) + kv(1)− d0)
+, ku(1), kv(1)]
= (ku(1) + kv(1)− d0)
+
< ku(1),
where (a) follows because piu(1) ⊆ Π(0) and (c) is a result
of Corollary 2. So ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , t} we have piu(1) " Πv(j)
which results in Πu(i) " Πv(j), ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , t}. By
symmetry, we have the second assertion of the lemma, namely,
Πv(j) " Πu(i), ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , t}.
Now, it only remains to check (b). We will prove this by
induction. Obviously, Π(0)∩Πv(1) = piv(1). Suppose that we
have Π(0) ∩ Πv(k) = piv(1) where k < t then we show that
it also holds for k + 1.
We know that piv(1) ⊆ Π(0) ∩ Πv(k + 1). To show that
Π(0) ∩ Πv(k + 1) ⊆ piv(1) we proceed as follows. Let w ∈
Π(0) ∩ Πv(k + 1) then w ∈ Π(0) and w ∈ Πv(k + 1) =∑k+1
i=1 piv(i). We may decompose w as w =
∑k+1
i=1 wi where
wi ∈ piv(i). Then note that wk+1 = w−
∑k
i=1 wi ∈ Π(k− 1)
and by using Lemma 3 it can be shown that Π(k−1)∩piv(k+
1) = ∅ w.h.p. So we conclude that wk+1 = 0 which means
w ∈ Πv(k). This shows that w ∈ Π(0) ∩ Πv(k) where by
induction assumption we have w ∈ piv(1) and we are done.
Proof of Corollary 4: Because Πu(0) " Πv(j − 1) then
by Lemma 2 we have pia(1) " Πv(j − 1) w.h.p. So as a
result we have Πa(i) " Πv(j − 1) ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , t}. Now,
because Πb(j) ⊆ Πv(j − 1) we conclude that Πa(i) " Πb(j)
∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , t} w.h.p. By symmetry, we also deduce the
other part of the corollary.
APPENDIX B
ALGEBRAIC MODEL FOR SYNCHRONOUS NETWORKS
In this appendix we employ an algebraic approach to
analyze the dissemination protocol given in Algorithm II.1.
This approach is similar to [15] and [1], but differs in that we
introduce memory into the coding process.
We introduce memory as follows. Suppose we are interested
in finding the transfer function between the source and an
arbitrary node v. Let X be a n × ! matrix with rows the
n packets (vectors) that the source wants to transmit to the
receivers. We assume that dim(〈X〉) = n. Let Y (t) ∈ Fξ×!q
be a matrix with rows the packets that pass through the ξ edges
of the network at time t. Let Zv(t) be the set of packets that
node v receives at time t. Similarly to [15], we will write
state-space equations that involve these vectors; however, we
will ensure that, at each time t, coding at each node occurs
across all the packets that the node has received before time
t.
In every time-slot t, the source injects |Out(S)| packets
into the network that are random linear combinations of the
original source packets X . These linear combinations can be
20
captured asM(t)X , whereM(t) ∈ F|Out(S)|×nq is a random
matrix. Intermediate network nodes will transmit packets on
their outgoing edges depending on the network connectivity,
and the state of the dissemination protocol.
The network connectivity can be captured by the ξ × ξ
adjacency matrix F of the labeled line graph of the graph
G, defined as follows
Fij !
{
1 head(ei) = tail(ej),
0 otherwise.
To model random coding over a field Fq, we consider a
sequence of random matrices F (t)1 , . . . ,F (t)t−1 which conform
to F . That is, the entries of these matrices have for i 2= j
(F (t)k )ij = 0 wherever Fij = 0 and have random numbers
from Fq in all other places.
The dissemination protocol dictates when a node can start
transmitting packets, according to its waiting time (equiva-
lently, when the outgoing edges of the node will have packets
send through them). To capture this, we will use the step
function u(t),
u(t) !
{
1 t ≥ 0,
0 otherwise,
and define the ξ × ξ diagonal matrix U(t) as,
∀i ∈ E : U ii(t) ! u
(
t− τtail(i) − 1
)
,
where τv is the waiting time for node v. In this section we
assume that the waiting times may have arbitrary values and
we do not restrict them according to Definition 1.
Using the above definitions, the set of packets (vectors) that
each node v receives in every time instant t > 0 can be written
as follows

Y (t) = U(t)
(
AM(t)X +
∑t−1
i=1 F
(t)
i Y (t− i)
)
,
Zv(t) = BvY (t),
(11)
where Y (0) = 0. In the above, A ∈ Fξ×|Out(S)|q is a matrix
which represents the connection of node S to the rest of the
network. In the same way matrix Bv ∈ F| In(v)|×ξq defines the
connection of node v to the set of edges in the network.
It is worth noting that although (11) is written for the
packets transmitted on each edge, we can write the same set
of equations for the coding vectors.
Suppose we are interested in finding the output of such
a system at some time instant T . We can rewrite the above
equations by defining new matrices as follows. We can collect
the source random operations as
MT !

 M(1)...
M(T )

 ∈ FT |Out(S)|×nq .
For the states of system we define
Y T !

 Y (1)...
Y (T )

 ∈ FξT×!q .
We also define a new set of matrices which represent the input-
output relation. Using matrixA we define the following matrix
AT ! IT ⊗A =

 A . . .
A

 ∈ FξT×T |Out(S)|q .
For the connection of node v we define
BT,v !
[
0| In(v)|×(T−1)ξ Bv
]
∈ F| In(v)|×ξTq .
We define matrix F T which represent how the states are
related to each other
F T !


0 0 0 0 · · ·
F
(2)
1 0 0 0 · · ·
F
(3)
2 F
(3)
1 0 0 · · ·
F
(4)
3 F
(4)
2 F
(4)
1 0 · · ·... ... ... ... . . .

 ∈ F
ξT×ξT
q .
Finally, we use matrix UT that captures the time when
transmissions start for each edge
UT !

 U(1) . . .
U(T )

 ∈ FξT×ξTq .
Using the above definitions, we can rewrite (11) as follows

Y T = UT (ATMTX + F TY T ) ,
Zv(T ) = BT,vY T .
This equation can be solved to find the input-output transfer
matrix at time T which results in
Zv(T ) =
[
BT,v(I −UTF T )
−1UTATMT
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
HSv(T )
X , (12)
where HSv(T ) ∈ F| In(v)|×nq . From the definition of matrix
F T , we know that it is a “strictly lower triangular matrix”
which means F T is nilpotent and we have F TT = 0. The same
applies for the matrix UTF T , namely we have (UTF T )T =
0. So the matrix (I−UTF T )−1 has an inverse which is equal
to
(I −UTF T )
−1 = I + · · ·+ (UTF T )
T−1.
Finally, note that if the nodes do not wait before starting the
transmission (τv = 0 : ∀v ∈ V ), then we will have UT =
IξT×ξT .
A. Proof of Theorem 2
For simplicity, in the following proof, we assume that each
edge of the network has capacity 1. Edges with capacity more
than 1 can be modeled by replacing them with multiple edges
of unit capacity.
From (12) the transfer matrix from S to v at time T is
equal to HSv(T ). Knowing that the min-cut of node v is cv,
we choose a set of cv incoming edges to v such that there exist
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cv edge disjoint paths from S to v and find the input-output
transfer matrix just for this set of edges. Then we can write
HˆSv(T ) = BˆT,v(I −UTF T )
−1UTATMT (13)
= BˆT,v
(
I + · · ·+ (UTF T )
T−1
)
UTATMT ,
where HˆSv(T ) ∈ Fcv×nq and BˆT,v ∈ Fcv×ξTq . Let f (t,k)ij
denote for the entries of F (t)k and m(t)ij denote for the entries
of M(t). Every node in the network performs random linear
network coding so m(t)ij and f (t,k)ij (those that are not zero)
are chosen uniformly at random from Fq .
From (13) we know that each entry of HˆSv(T ) is a
polynomial of degree at most T in variables m(t)ij and f (t,k)ij .
For T > t0(v) where t0(v) ! maxi∈P (v) τi, we know that
there exists a trivial solution for variables m(t)ij and f (t,k)ij
(which simply routes cv packets from S to v through the cv
edge disjoint paths) that results in
HˆSv(T ) =
[
Icv 0cv×(n−cv)
]
. (14)
Note that by changing the routing solution (in fact by chang-
ing the variables m(t)ij properly) we could change the place
of identity matrix in (14) arbitrarily. We conclude that the
determinant of every cv × cv sub-matrix of HˆSv(T ) (which
is a polynomial of degree at most cvT in variables m(t)ij and
f (t,k)ij ) is not identical to zero. So by using the Schwartz-Zippel
lemma [36] we can upper bound the probability that HˆSv(T )
is not full rank if the variables m(t)ij and f (t,k)ij are chosen
uniformly at random as follows
P
[
rank HˆSv(T ) < cv
]
<
cvT
q
.
We can apply the same argument for k < ncv consecutivetime-slots to show that
P
[
rank HˆSv(T : T + k − 1) < kcv
]
<
kcv(T + k)
q
,
where
HˆSv(T : T + k − 1) !

 HˆSv(T )...
HˆSv(T + k − 1)

 .
Now let us define the event Ak(v) as follows
Ak(v) : rank HˆSv(T : T + k − 1) = kcv.
Then we can write
P [∩v∈VAk(v)] = 1− P
[
∪v∈VA
!
k(v)
]
≥ 1−
∑
v∈V
P
[
A!k(v)
]
≥ 1−
k(T + k)
q
∑
v∈V
cv,
where T > t0 and t0 ! maxv∈V t0(v).
This means that assuming q is large enough we are sure
that with high probability each node v receives cv innovative
packets per time slot for t > t0.
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